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@deckyard/git

Security

A git command line has more ways in than it looks. A branch named --upload-pack=touch /tmp/x is an option. A URL ext::sh -c ... runs a command. GIT_DIR in the environment, as a hook sets it, makes -C point somewhere else. A repository's hooks and core.fsmonitor are programs. The deck closes each of these, so names, revisions, paths and URLs can come from users.

What the deck does

  • No shell. Every command is an argument list handed to the program.
  • Names are checked as git checks them. Branch, tag and remote names follow git check-ref-format: no spaces, .., ~ ^ : ? * [ \, @ plus an opening brace, leading or trailing / or ., .lock endings, and no leading -.
  • Revisions and URLs may not start with -, and revisions are passed after --end-of-options where git supports it. Control characters are refused in both.
  • Paths come after -- and are literal (--literal-pathspecs): -rf is a file name and *.txt is not a glob, nor is :(top) magic.
  • Remotes are allow-listed. protocol.allow=never, then only Config.protocols (default https and ssh). Local paths and file:// need file in the list: with it, a URL from a user can clone any repository the process can read. ext::, fd:: and every other transport::address form is refused before git sees it, and a scheme:// URL cannot reach a git-remote-<scheme> helper on the PATH. withProtocols changes the list; http and git are unencrypted.
  • The environment cannot redirect a command. GIT_DIR, GIT_WORK_TREE, GIT_INDEX_FILE, GIT_OBJECT_DIRECTORY and the other variables that beat -C are removed with env -u on every command.
  • git does not look above the repository. open takes the top level; GIT_CEILING_DIRECTORIES stops a subdirectory of some other repository from being taken for it.
  • Programs from the repository do not run. Hooks are off (core.hooksPath=/dev/null) unless withHooks turns them on, the fsmonitor is off, and diffs and blame run no external diff or text conversion, which a .gitattributes in the repository could select.
  • open checks the top level. git does not look above the directory, and open compares the top level git reports with the one asked for.
  • Credentials stay out of error messages. https://user:token@... is written https://***@... in the deck's messages; git strips it from its own.
  • Nothing waits for a person. GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0: a remote that wants a password fails instead of hanging. The locale is C, so messages are English and stable.
  • Every command has a timeout (withTimeout, two minutes by default), and replaced objects (refs/replace/) are ignored, so an id names what it says.

What it does not do

  • A repository's own configuration is still git's. .git/config can set core.sshCommand, filters and aliases that run programs. git refuses repositories owned by another user (safe.directory); do not run the deck on a .git directory that came from an upload or an archive.
  • The timeout kills git, not its children. An ssh or git-remote-https it started can outlive it until its connection drops. A command killed while writing can leave .git/index.lock behind; the next command that needs the index then fails until it is removed.
  • A URL can reach any host the machine can. Cloning a user's https:// or ssh:// URL connects to internal hosts as readily as to GitHub; filter hosts before calling clone or lsRemote if that matters.
  • run is unchecked. It passes your arguments as they are, after the hardened prefix. Never build them from user input.
  • Credentials are git's. The deck never sees them: use an ssh agent, deploy keys, or a credential helper.